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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. The language is almost identical and provides as follows:

The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant
argued the police did not have authority to enter his private residence. The cause
asserted by the City was that officers were responding to a dispatch call of a
possible altercation between two males. Both males exited the home and were
interviewed by police. The police speculated that others may be in the home and
searched the home based on officer safety concerns and the supposed concern for
others that might be in the home.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant entered a Sery plea reserving the right to appeal this
particular issue—the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On November 4,2007, Officers (3) from Spanish Fork City and one additional
officer from the Utah County Sheriffs Department responded to a call referencing an
altercation between two males at a Spanish Fork residence. (Suppression Hearing
(SH) page 6/ page 14 L. 12-14 )The call did not indicate more excepting a possible
altercation. (SH 6 L 3). There was no suggestion made of the nature of incident nor
the presence of any weapons.( SH 6 L. 13)
The Spanish Fork officers arrived at the approximate location of the reported
altercation to hear sounds of two people shouting. The sounds were coming from the
basement area of the defendant's home. (SH 7 L. 8/ L. 15-19
The officers reported hearing something being hitting against a window. (SH 7
L. 23-24). The officers speculated that something was thrown against a wall. (SH 15
L24)
The officers knocked on the front door to the home. After a delay, the door
was opened. Both males came out—pulled out. (SH 16 L. 9-12) Two dogs emerged
from the residence. The defendant secured the dogs in the back yard of the home.
(SH 9 L. 2-12). Both individuals were handcuffed and detained. (SH 9 L. 25) (SH 9 L.
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13-16). No weapons were found on either person. (SH 20 L. 6) Both were
questioned and both advised that they had been drinking and had returned home
and had a verbal altercation. (SH 17 L. 3-5). However, this discussion occurred after
the officers had entered the home and searched. (SH 18 L. 15)
The officers knew that they had the two person noted in the dispatch call
outside the home. (SH17L 13)
The officers sought permission to enter the home but were refused by both
persons, including the defendant Taylor.
The officers entered the home for reportedly officer safety concerns and
concern for others. (SH 10 L. 7-14/ Page 19 L. 13-14). However, the officers knew
that the report was based on two males in a possible altercation. (SH 15 L. 1-3).
They knew the noise coming from within the home was from two persons. (SH 15 L.
8). The basis to enter the home was based on speculation that something still could
be going on in the home. (SH 17 L. 15-18/ Page 18 L 24 - Page 19 L. 5) The only
other noise being heard was the two dogs that had run from the house and these
were secured by Mr. Taylor. (SH 17 L 20)
Neither person was arrested by the officers at this time. There were no further
indications of any other persons being in the home. (SH 10 L 9/ Page 13 L. 8).
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There was no information that any physical blows had been exchanged between
either party. There was no information that any property had been destroyed.
The contraband was located in a little box that was opened up and found
therein. (SH 12 L 23-24).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The chief protection granted by both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Art I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is to prevent the physical
entry into a private residence. Absent a search warrant, officers may not search the
residence of a citizen. The only exception to such a prohibition is the presence of
'imperative cause' justifying an immediate entrance.
The Spanish Fork police officers here justified the entrance based on the
speculation that someone else may be in the home and under the guise of 'officer
safety'. Both concerns are based on officer speculation without any particularized
basis.
ARGUMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

The "'physical entry of the home is the chief evil, against which the wording
of the Fourth Amendment is directed."' Accordingly, warrantless entries are
presumptively unreasonable. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 559 (2004) (quoting;
United States v. Saadeh. 61 F.3d 510, 516 (7th Cir.1995); Pavton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 585-86, 100 S.Ct. 1371,63 LEd.2d 639 (1980), quoting United States v.
United States District Court. 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752
(1972). State v.Duran, 2005 UT App 409,131 P.3d 246; State v. Duran, 2007 UT
23,156P.3d795.
In recognition of this right, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that officers,
even with an arrest warrant, cannot cross the threshold of the home to execute the
warrant. Pavton v. New York 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Police cannot enter a home to
arrest a suspected drunk driver, notwithstanding the existence of outright probable
cause and the immediacy of the officer's pursuit. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
749,104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). See Commonwealth v. Kiser, 48
Mass. App. Ct. 647 (2000), 724 N.E.2d 348.
In State v. Duran 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795, the Utah Supreme Court
precluded officers from entering a home based on the detection of the odor of
marijuana being consumed. The Duran Court found few exceptions exists to
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authorize entry without a warrant: In absence of "specially pressing or urgent law
enforcement need", a warrant is mandated.
In State v. Beavers, Ct. App. Utah 1993,859 P.2d 9, this Court found the
Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless entry into a private residence where the
officers possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. This is
supported by State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795. Here in the present
setting, the officers had no exigency. The officers speculated that someone else
possibly may be still in the home.
This Court in State v. South. 885 P.2d 795,800 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), rev'd
on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) recognized this danger when they
found that "the mere possibility that evidence may be destroyed" does not justify a
warrantless entry.
In South, a police detective went to the defendant's home to investigate the
theft. While interviewing defendant at the door, he detected a heavy odor of burnt
marijuana. Based on that observation, he obtained a warrant to search the home and
returned with three other officers. The defective warrant only authorized the search
of the defendant, but not of the home. The State claimed that, even though the
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warrant was defective, the warrantless search was justified by exigent
circumstances; the consumption of the burning marijuana.
The South Court balanced the State's interest there finding it did not
outweigh the societal interest in prohibiting warrantless searches of homes.
In State v. Cushinq. 2003 Ut. App. 335,79 P.3d 962, this Court found illegal
the entry into the apartment to search for suspected contraband even though officers
observed Cushing unexpectedly jumped out of the car and run into an apartment.
The officer surmised that Cushing was attempting to evade detection of contraband
or to obtain a weapon inside the apartment. After some warning, Cushing exited the
apartment, was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. The officers then searched
the apartment locating contraband. This Court found the search into the apartment
illegal and suppressed.
This Court noted:
I t is settled doctrine that probable cause for belief that certain
articles subject to seizure are in a dwelling cannot of itself
justify a search without a warrant.'" . . . If probable cause to
believe a search of the home will yield evidence of contraband
is insufficient, then reasonable suspicion certainly will not do:

EXCEPTIONS
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The Supreme Court in Duran noted the danger of expanding the justification
for warrantless searches. The Court feared officers would exploit any exception
grant to conduct warrantless searches in other contexts. They held at page 798:
We also decline to sanction the warrantless search in
this context because we fear that it would be difficult to leash
warrantless searches in other contexts in which consumption and
destruction of evidence merge. It is certainly not far-fetched
to envision law enforcement officers exploiting the rationale
that consumption of contraband is also evidence destruction to
justify warrantless searches in other contexts. After all, the
exigency present here is not appreciably different from a
report of consumption of alcohol by underage persons in a
dwelling. Like smoking marijuana, underage drinking is a
jailable offense crime in which the criminal act involves
simultaneous consumption of contraband and destruction of
evidence. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-104, -209(1)
(2005). Also, olfactory-based probable cause could,
under a doctrine that equated consumption of contraband with
destruction of evidence, permit a law enforcement officer to
claim exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search to
apprehend eighteen-year-olds believed to be smoking tobacco.

This Court has been cautious in the expansion of any exception; particularly
the 'emergency aide doctrine'. Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, fl 12,
994 P,2d 1283.
The Court recognized the likelihood of misuse of the 'emergency aid
doctrine', finding the emergency aid entry justified only where there is "some reliable
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and specific indication of the probability that a person is suffering from a serious
physical injury." Salt Lake City v. Davidson at fl 20. The Court cautioned that an
intrusions to administer aid to less severe injuries than serious bodily injury may
render unconstitutional a search or seizure made incident to the warrantless entry.
See also Holmes v. State, 347 Ark. 530 (2002) 65 S.W.3d 860; People v. Smith, 40
P.3d 1287 (Colorado 2002).
A similar case to the present is State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227,666 P.2d 802,
812 (1983) (en banc). There police responded to a reported fight at a motel. Id. 666
P.2d at 804. Upon arrival, police were informed that there was an ongoing rape in a
specific room, but when police knocked on the door the purported victim emerged
fully clothed and apparently unfrightened. Police talked with defendant for a moment
and noticed an empty holster protruding from a backpack on the bed. The officers
restrained defendant in the motel room and in the ensuing search found a gun and
drugs. Noting that any emergency with respect to the woman had clearly ended, the
Davis court rejected the State's claims that an emergency required police to enter
and search the room for their own safety as argued by the City here.
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EXIGENT CIRCUMSTGANCES
As noted by the Utah Courts, the government bears the particularly heavy
burden of proving the warrantless entry into a home falls within the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,
13 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). State v. Duran. 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795.
"Exigent circumstances are those 'that would cause a reasonable person to
believe that entry... was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other
persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some
other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.'" United
States v. McConnev. 728 F,2d 1195,1199 (9th Cir. 1984) State v. Duran. 2005 UT
App 409 131 P.3d 246: State v. Duran. 2005 UT App 409,131 P.3d 246; State v.
Duran, 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795.; State v. South. 885 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct.App.
1994), rev'd on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996).
A recent decision by the Oregon Court is State v. Bentz, 211 Or App 129,,
158 P3d 1081. There a police officer received a call stating that, moments earlier,
someone had observed a man putting a gun into his waistband and entering an
apartment. Officers responded finding three or four people sitting or standing just
inside the door, one of whom matched the description given by the caller. Two
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officers began walking toward the front door of the apartment with their guns drawn.
As they approached, defendant's brother ran into the apartment. Slyter yelled at him
to stop, but he did not. At that point, the man who matched the description given by
the caller spun around and faced Slyter. Slyter "took him down" at gunpoint, and the
other officer patted him down and found a pistol in a holster on Ward's right side.
They also found methamphetamine on his person.
The officer believed that defendant's brother who had run into the
apartment could be hiding a gun in the apartment. Slyter yelled into the apartment for
"somebody to come out of the apartment." After about five minutes of continued
yelling, Rubin and a woman, Lohr, came out of the apartment. By then, three or four
additional police officers had arrived on the scene. Officers asked if there was
anyone else in the apartment, and they both said no. One person indicated that her
two small children were in the apartment. The officer entered the apartment finding
defendant and another woman sitting in the living room. They remained seated when
he walked in. The police officers arrested him and conducted a search of his person
before transporting the person in a police vehicle. The search discovered a small
bag containing methamphetamine. Defendant challenged the search.
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The Oregon Court found the search illegal and suppressed although the
State argued that exigent circumstances existed to enter the apartment. The Court
found no imperative to enter the apartment. See also People v. Plante, 3-05-0075
(III.App. 1-26-2007); State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742 (2003) 583 S.E.2d 573.
State v. Pando, A06A1984 (Ga.App. 3-8-2007). State v. Guqqenmos, A133266
(Or.App. 2-11-2009).

TIME TO PROCURE WARRANT
Other Courts, including Utah, have required the City to demonstrate that the
procurement of a warrant was not feasible because the exigencies of the situation
made the chosen course imperative. State v. Lorocco, 794 P.2d 460,470-71 (Utah
1990) (safety of police and risk of loss of evidence); State v. Limb, 581 P,2d 142,
144 (Utah 1978) (risk of loss of evidence); State v. Parker, 399 So,2d 24, 28 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1981); Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 2003).
The City offered no evidence justifying the immediate entry absent the time
and need to obtain a warrant.
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POSSIBLITY OF STAKING OUT THE HOME
The Beaver Court noted that the risk of harm to others is diminished in the
residential setting because if the person police wish to question a person located in a
dwelling they can generally be staked out until the person emerges, if a polite knock
at the door fails to produce a suspect willing to voluntarily answer police inquiries.
The Beaver Court would suggest that police follow the dictates of U.C.A. 77-7-8.
These same concerns were also addressed in the recent decision in State v. Duran.
In Illinois v . McArther, 531 U.S. 326 (2001), the Supreme Court found it
reasonable to detain a homeowner while they secured his residence to obtain a
search warrant. They found the detention pending the search warrant authorization
was reasonable since police had probable cause to believe that the trailer home
contained evidence of a crime and contraband; they spoke with the defendant's wife
and made a very rough assessment of her reliability that drugs were within the
trailer; they had a valid reason to fear that, unless restrained, the drugs would be
destroyed; police made reasonable efforts to reconcile the law enforcement needs
with the demands of defendant's personal privacy; they neither searched the trailer
nor arrested McArthur before obtaining a warrant. Rather, they imposed a
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significantly less restrictive restraint, preventing him from entering the trailer
unaccompanied. They left his home and his belongings intact — until a neutral
Magistrate, finding probable cause, issued a warrant. The detention was for a limited
period of time.
ENTRY INTO HOME TO INVESTIGATE MISDEMEANOR
Writing in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson
explained why a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted :

"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances
might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of
all sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable
necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the
offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards
of the method of attempting to reach it
It is to me a
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following
up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it
When an
officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be
in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate
and serious consequences if he postponed action to
get a warrant." Id., at 459-460
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Other Courts including Utah refuse to permit warrantless home arrests for
misdemeanor crimes and even some felonies. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190
Conn. 440,453,461 A.2d 963,970 (1983) (The exception is narrowly drawn to
cover cases of real and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to the
investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded"); People v. Strelow, 96
Mich. App. 182,190-193, 292 N.W.2d 517,521-522 (1980). See also People v.
Sanders, 59 III. App.3d 6,374 N.E.2d 1315 (1978) (burglary without weapons not
grave offense of violence for this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N.W.2d 5 (S. D.
1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes).
See also People v. Allison. 86 P.3d 421,423-24 (Colo. 2004), wherein the
police responded to a 911 hang-up call, removed a married couple with slight facial
injuries, and then re-entered their residence to look for other victims. In holding that
the emergency aid doctrine did not apply, the court found it significant that the police
did not ask the couple if anyone needed medical assistance before entering the
home.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-8 (2003) (officer must demand admission and
explain purpose for entering before making a forcible entry to a building or dwelling in
order to arrest an occupant) and § 77-23-210 (2003) (officer must give notice of
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authority and purpose before executing search warrant).
PROTECTIVE SWEEPS
"Protective Sweeps" is a recognized but limited exception to the Fourth
Amendment. The Courts balance the need for officer safety against the need to
constrain officers from circumventing privacy rights. The Courts recognize that the
desire to investigate maybe camouflaged as a disguised 'officer safety' claim.
It is not a justification to go beyond locked rooms. It is not an excuse to enter
a home. Here the officers were limited to the immediate area (outside the home).
U.S. V. Wilson. 36 F.3d 1298,1305-07 (5* Cir. 1994). U.S. v. Arch. 7 F.3d 1300,
1303 (7th Cir. 1993). It cannot be used to condone a protective search for
investigative purposes only. U.S.VOguns. 921 F.2d 442,447 (2nd Cir. 1990).
In State v. Beavers, the Court advised that officers cannot enter a home based on
reasonable suspicion. There must be more.
ARTICULABLE FACTS
The belief alone that contraband may be present cannot serve as a basis for
a warrantees entry and search. U.S. v. Anderson, 981 F2d 1560,1568 (10th Cir.
1992). In State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), the court concluded the
mere possibility that a suspect may have a weapon or that evidence might be
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destroyed is not enough to fall under the 'protective sweep' doctrine. State v. Palmer,
803 P.2d at 1253. See also United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045,1049 (9th Cir.
1993) (stating police must have "reasonable belief that exigent circumstances exist);
United States v. Roark, 36 F.3d 14,17 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting exigent
circumstances claim based solely on "unsubstantiated suspicions" of police officer
who feared removal of marijuana). See United States v. Napue. 834 F.2d 1311,1327
(7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing possibility that officers "suspected, or had reason to
suspect," that hotel room was occupied, but concluding "the government did not offer
evidence at the suppression hearing to support such a suspicion"). Because "there is
almost always a partisan who might destroy or conceal evidence," United States v.
Davis, 423 F.2d 974,979 (5th Cir. 1970), the State must show more than "a mere
possibility that evidence might be removed," People v. Blasius, 435 Mich. 573,459
N.W.2d 906,916 (Mich. 1990). The State failed to present evidence "that even
intimated that the officers reasonably believed that destruction, removal or
concealment of contraband material was imminent or threatened." State v. Peterson,
525 S.W.2d 599,607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
In State v. Grossi, 2003 Ut. App. 181, 72 P.3d 686, officers learned of via a
call that two women were being assaulted. When the officer arrived, one woman ran
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toward him and told him that the defendant had dragged here friend by the hair into
the basement apartment where he was assaulting her. The officer knocked on the
apartment door and the defendant appeared at the window. He initially refused to
answer the door. The defendant then yelled to the alleged victim and told her to tell
the officer that she was alright. The officer heard nothing. Defendant then reported
that he would send the victim out the cellar door. The defendant eventually came
out. The officer also learned that the purported victim exited the apartment through
the cellar door and ran northbound.
The defendant wanted to secure his apartment after the officer arrested
him. The officer then refused to allow Grossi to do so. The officer then entered the
apartment under the guise of locating a key to lock the door. As the officer entered
the home, another female came out of the bedroom. She was trying to get her cat.
After conducting this pat down, the officer decided to secure the remainder of the
apartment. When he looked in the bedroom, he saw multiple drug items in plain
view. The officers seized the items and Defendant was charged with four drug
related counts.
The Court's analysis relied on Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325, 331,
110 S.Ct. 1093,1096(1990). Citing Buie they reported:
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"A 'protective search' is a quick and limited search of premises,
incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of
police officers or others. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327,110 S.Ct. at
1094. An officer must have a "reasonable belief based on
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted] the
officer in believing that the area swept harbored an individual
posing a danger to the officer or others." Id. at 327,.. .the mere
possibility of such a presence is not enough." Haves v. State,
797 P.2d 962. 967 (Nev. 1990).

The court's analysis turned on the fact that the alleged suspect, was
already in police custody and not a threat to anyone. While Karren appeared in the
apartment unexpectedly, and was nervous, she was not known to be violent, to carry
a weapon, or to have access to a weapon. Based on these facts, the protective
sweep was not justified and found the evidence should have been suppressed.
CONCLUSION
The physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed. Mr. Taylor had the right to deny officer's
entrance into his home. This right is of constitutional significance and may not be
overcome by a speculation that others may be yet in the house.
The only time an entrance has been authorized without warrant is where
the circumstance making immediate entrance imperative. Here, the officer's
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speculation about the possibility of others being in the home does not justify
entrance
Dated this 12th day of Marcl;
,arter
Attorney for Defendant
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